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1 A problem of size
[. . . ] Thus, category theory is not just another fieldwhose
set-theoretic foundation can be left as an exercise. An in-
teraction between category theory and set theory arises
because there is a real question: what is the appropiate
set-theoretic foundation of category theory?
Andreas Blass1
It is common to date the birth of category theory to the publication of Eilen-
berg and Mac Lane’s paper,2 A general theory of natural equivalences. Already
in this pioneering work, we can find a first analysis of some foundational issues
concerning the raising theory. In fact Eilenberg andMac Lane dedicate an entire
paragraph to discuss some foundational problems of the set-theoretical inter-
pretation of their theory. Here is the beginning of this paragraph:3
We remarked in §3 that such examples as the “category of all sets”,
the “category of all groups” are illegitimate. The difficulties and anti-
nomies here involved are exactly those of ordinary intuitiveMengen-
lehre; no essentially newparadoxes are apparently involved. Any rig-
orous foundationcapableof supporting theordinary theoryof classes
would equally well support our theory. Hence we have chosen to
adopt the intuitive standpoint, leaving the reader free whatever type
of logical foundation (or absence thereof) he may prefer.
The two authors immediately recognise the peculiarity of the constructions
involved in their theory and offer a first simple diagnosis: since there is nothing
new under the sun, just old well-known paradoxes, it is sufficient to give back
these issues to the field they belong, i.e. set theory. Despite the apparent haste
to dismiss thematter, what follows the abovementioned paragraph can be seen
as the first concrete attempt to solve the problem: after having discussed some
technical issues, the twomathematicians suggest a possible development of cat-
egory theory inside the framework of the theory of sets and classes in the style of
von Neumann, Bernays and Gödel’s set theory (NBG). Before entering into the
details of this and other proposals, it is important to focus on what is the prob-
lem. A good starting point is given by a critical analysis of the role played by the
notion of size in category theory. Indeed, with the exception of set theory, it is
difficult to find other mathematical fields where the notion of size plays such
2S. Eilenberg (1945).
3S. Eilenberg (1945), p. 246.
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a central role. On the other hand, in category theory the distinction between
small categories and large categories represents an important and inescapable
dichotomy raised at the very beginning of any reasonable introduction to the
subject. Nevertheless it is usual to get rid of this question as soon as possible
and the workingmathematician who uses category theory is therefore reluctant
to deepen the analysis of the foundations of the theory. The following dialogue4
is intended to parody this situation:
Dialogue 1.
TORTOISE: Hi Achilles, how are you? You have disappeared for a
while, what have you been up to?
ACHILLES: Mydear littleTortoise, youwon’t believe it, but I started
studying some abstract nonsense. And, let me say that I
found in it muchmore sense than is usually said.
TORTOISE: Good Achilles, I see you are not losing the habit to
challenge your mind. I also have tried to give meaning to
that bunch of arrows some time ago. . .now, I can just re-
member the definition of a category. Let me take the op-
portunity to ask you something that has botheredme since
that time. Can you tellmewhat peoplemeanwith the term
large category?
ACHILLES: Oh,mysweet little Tortoise, I knowwhat youaredriv-
ing at. . .you want to cheat me with the old story of the bar-
berundecided if he shaveshimself ornot. . . this time Iwon’t
fell for it. Thematter is simple: a large category is onewhose
collection of morphisms is a proper class.
TORTOISE: Then, let me bother you with my usual reasoning.
The natural question to pose now is: what do youmean by
proper class?
ACHILLES: Well, I’ll be polite and I won’t escape your innocent
inquisition. I will call a proper class a collection which is
not a set.
TORTOISE: It’s not exactly a definition, but I’ll give you that. I
believe you already know what I am going to ask next. . .
ACHILLES: Let’s see. Usually you don’t have so much imagina-
tion. The only new term I introduced in our dialogue is set.
I hope you don’t want to ask me what is a set. . .
4The characters of this invented dialogue have been inspired by the dialogues in Hofstadter
(1979).
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TORTOISE: Exactly Achilles: less fantasy and more pedantry is
the recipe of my philosophy. . .
ACHILLES: Ok. Let me surprise you. I have a new definition: a
set is an object of the category Set, whose object are sets
and whose morphisms are functions.
TORTOISE: Mmh.. . , you are right Achilles, you always surprise
me. . . I amafraid you lost yourway inanabstractnonsense. . .
Clearly positions like Achilles’ one are unsatisfying from every possible point
of view: mathematical, logical and philosophical. A proper category theorist,
probably, would have preferred to answer Tortoise’s question, “what is a set”,
saying “it’s an object of a well-pointed topos with a natural number object and
which satisfies the axiom of choice”. Since this answer costs much more effort
than trying to understand the problem, it is important to clarify what we mean
by the problem of set-theoretic foundations of category theory, in such a way
that also Achilles can understand why his position is not defensible.
It is an empirical fact that, to a great extent, mathematics can be formalized
in set theory: a rather common choice for this set-theoretic “codification” is rep-
resented by the axioms of Zermelo Fraenkel’s set theorywith the axiomof choice
(ZFC). For example, we can imagine to present group theory, algebraic topology
or functional anaysis with the language only of set theory: objects of these theo-
ries can be described as sets whose properties can be derived from set-theoretic
axioms. Following Blass,5 it is therefore natural to ask in what sense category
theory is an exception to this phenomenon. Why can’t we leave this codification
as a routine exercise?
As we have already observed, at the root of category theory lies the impor-
tant small/large distinction. When doing category theory some of the objects
and constructions that we deal with are (and have to be) essentially large. One
of thefirst problemwemeet ifwe regard this object fromaset- theoreticperspec-
tive is to find an adequate encoding for large categories such as the category of
all sets (Set) or the category of all groups (Grp). These categories are built hav-
ing in mind essentially large collections and cannot be treated simply as sets.6
This is not the only problem. The following list resumes some of themain issues
that are essential to develop category theory.7 In every reasonable foundational
framework8 we want to be able to:
5See the quotation at the beginning of this section.
6The argument is well known. A possible way to present it is the following: if the collection of all
sets,V , was a set, then the collection of all its subsets, ℘V , would be a set included inV , contradicting
Cantor’s theorem.
7Compare with Feferman (2006) pp. 2–3.
8We use framework as synonym of metatheory or foundational system.
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(A) form the category of every structure of a given type. Some elementary ex-
amples are: Set, Grp and Top;
(B) perform somebasic set-theoretic constructions over an arbitrary category;
(C) form the category of all the functors between two arbitrary categories.
If we are specifically interested in set-theoretic foundations for category the-
ory we would also like to be able to
(D) decide the consistency of these systemswith respect to someaccepted sys-
tem of set theory.
It is worthmentioning that, beyond the concept of “large category” (require-
ment A), there are several different notions that rely on the same concept (locally
small category, small limits, etc.). The frameworks should be expressive enough
to make sense of each of these.
Aswewill see the choice of a specific foundational systemwill affect substan-
tially the fulfilment of these requirements.
The next section gives an overview of the foundational proposals that wewill
consider in the rest of the paper.
2 Set-theoretic and other proposals: a retrospective.
As already noted, debates about foundations of category theory started with the
very introduction of the notion of category. The rapid development of the the-
ory and the ubiquity of categorical notions in differentmathematical fields have
brought these foundational issues to the attention of several mathematicians.
In the sequel wewill consider some standard set-theoretic approaches to the
problem of foundations of category theory. It is important to keep in mind that
set theory is just one possible approach. Even among the set-theoretic frame-
works, we won’t be able to cover exhaustively all those proposed in the past, for
example, Feferman’s proposal to use Quine’s set theory,New Foundations.9 The
question of what the proper set-theoretic foundation of category theory is can
be misleading. We could argue that category theory, as any other mathemati-
cal subject, does not need any foundation either for its own internal develop-
ment, or for understanding it. Nevertheless, once we have raised the question,
we find that different solutions are at our disposal. Aswewill see none of the set-
theoretical proposalswewill consider definitely solve the problem. However, we
stress that to a great extent each of these proposals is expressive enough to cover
most of the cases of interest for the “working mathematician”.
An important part in the debate of foundations of category theory that de-
serves a treatment on its own, is the possibility to regard category theory itself
9The interested reader should consult Feferman (2006).
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as a foundational theory. The idea to consider category theory as a universal
language capable of interpreting the entiremathematical edifice has been firstly
proposed by Lawvere in the mid 60s. His research has led to a purely categori-
cal description of the category Set. Nowadays, after his influential paper,10 it is
common to refer to these axiomswith the acronymETCS: Elementary Theory of
the Category of Sets.
From a philosophical perspective, the project of Lawvere is intertwined with
what has been called categorical structuralism.11 As recent debates have shown,
progress is impossible without a preliminarily agreed understanding of what is
meant by the use of adjectives “structural” and “foundational” in this context.12
Close to categorical structuralism, but not coincidingwith Lawvere’s position, is
the idea to regard category theory as a foundation because of its unifying char-
acter. This position emerges for example in Marquis13 and has recently been
supported by some novel results discovered in topos theory.14
Wefinallymention a recent area of research that investigates set theory from
a novel categorical perspective: Algebraic Set Theory (AST). The main goal of
AST is to give a uniform categorical description for set-theoretical formal sys-
tems. Without addressingdirectly any foundational issues, AST focusesonbring-
ing to light algebraic aspects of these systems by means of category theory.15
We can now focus on the organisation of the foundational proposals that we
consider. The frameworks we will treat are the following:
• an approach internal to ZFC,
• NBG andMK,16
• Grothendieck’s universes,
• Mac Lane’s proposal,
• Feferman’s proposal.
The first two set theories have in common the idea of using the notion of
class to interpret the notion of size arising in category theory. The other three,
instead, make use (in a more or less explicit way) of the notion of universe in
order to better approximate the distinction small/large. Inspired by Shulman
(2008), we suggest a possible recast of these proposals bymeans of these central
notions.
10Lawvere (2005)
11See for example Awodey (1996), McLarty (2004).
12The interested reader should consult Hellman (2003) and Awodey (2004).
13See Marquis (2009).
14See Caramello (2010).
15A standard reference for AST is the book Joyal 1995. For a complete bibliography the reader
should visit http://www.phil.cmu.edu/projects/ast/.
16MK is the acronym for Morse-Kelley set theory.
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Before giving the details of these possible solutions we recall, in the next sec-
tion, some specific examples of theorems “sensitive to themathematical frame-
work”.
3 Examples
Togive an ideaof theubiquity ofnotionsof size in category theorywe recall some
basic results and definitions where these concepts play an important role17
Definition 1 (locally small category). A category C is called locally small if, given
two objects, a and b, the collection of morphisms between them, HomC(a, b), is
small.
If a category C is locally small then there exists the Hom-functor:
HomC : C op × C→ Set .
Examples of locally small categories are: Set, Grp and in general all the cate-
gories built from “sets-with-structure”. Given two locally small categories C and
D, the category of functors between them, DC, is not in general, locally small.
A central notion in category theory is that of complete category: also in this
case instances of the notion of size are explicitly involved.
Definition 2 (complete category). A category C is said to be complete if every
functor F : J → C, whose domain is a small category J, has limit.
Examples of complete categories are: Set, Grp, Rng, Comp Haus. When the
category is both small and complete, then it is just a preorder. Actually some-
thing stronger holds:
Theorem 2. If a category C admits limits for any functor F : D → C, with D any
discrete category, then C is a preorder.
For the proof see Borceaux (1994), proposition 2.7.1. This theorem explains
why, in order to have a notion of completeness which makes sense for all cate-
gories, it is reasonable to ask for limits just for those functors whose domain is a
small category J .
Another important theoremwhich is usually quoted when debating founda-
tional issue in category theory is Freyd’s adjoint theorem. We briefly recall some
definitions which occur in the body of this theorem.
17Most of the examples here and in the rest of the paper can be found in Shulman (2008).
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Definition 3. A category is said to be well-powered if each of its objects admits a
poset of subobjects.
Definition 4. A family Q of objects in a category C is called cogenerating if, given
two parallel distinct morphisms, f , g : a → b , there is a morphism h : b → q
with q ∈ Q such that hf , hg .
Theorem 3. Given a locally small, complete, well-powered, category C endowed
with a cogenerating set, and a category D, locally small, a functorG : C → D has
a left adjoint if and only if it preserves small limits.
For theproof seeLane (1998) ch. 5, par. 8. Note that this theoremrelies essen-
tially on somenotion of size. If the theorem is expressed just for small categories
we obtain the following.
Corollary 4. Given a complete lattice, C, a lattice morphism, G : C → D, which
preserves infima has a left adjoint.
Clearly this corollary is just a shadow of Freyd’s adjoint theorem. The signif-
icance of this latter can be appreciated if we think that in some cases this result
represents the only device to build an adjunction.
4 Large categories and classes
small = “set” / large = “class”
Classes (more precisely proper classes) arise in classical set theory (ZFC) as
those logical formulas without proper citizenship in models of set theory. They
are built from set-theoretical formulas by means of unrestricted comprehen-
sion, and, evenwithout a proper ontology,18 they are commonly introduced as a
useful device for manipulating formulas they abbreviate. As we are going to see
in the next paragraphs, classes represent possible candidates to interpret large
categories in a set-theoretical framework.
4.1 An approach internal to ZFC
A possible choice to give meaning to the notion of large categories is suggested
by the usual convention adopted to introduce classes in ZFC. A class in the lan-
18They don’t have proper ontolgy since they are outside the domain of discourse described by the
axioms. Following Quine we can say that classes “do not have being” since they are not values of
bound variables.
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guage of ZFC is a formal expression of the form x |φ(x)where φ is a formula of the
language of ZFC. Every set can be seen as a class (of its elements) but, by Rus-
sell’s paradox, the converse is not true. We say that a class is a proper class if it
is not a set.
Example 5. The class of all sets, V , is defined by the formula
V := {x |x = x}.
Another well-known proper class is the collection Ω of all ordinals. By the
Burali-Forti paradox it cannot be a set.
The idea of this foundational recipe is very simple: we call a category large
when the collection of its objects is a proper class.
One virtue of this approach is to work internally to ZFC: even if we cannot
directly manipulate large objects we are still able to work with the properties
(logical formulas in the language of ZFC) which define them. In this way we still
have the possibility to perform simple basic constructions over large categories:
for example if φ and ψ are formulas of ZFC we can still form the class of pairs
whose first element satisfy φ and whose second element satisfy ψ, i.e. we can
form the cartesian product of the two categories corresponding to φ and ψ.
The real problem of this approach is that ZFC cannot quantify over classes:
theorems saying “there is a category such that. . . ” or “for every category. . . ” can-
not even be stated in ZFC (one example is given by Freyd’s adjoint theorem).
Therefore, if we choose this foundational framework, we are led to reformulate
most of our theorems as meta-theorems, which seems quite unpleasant from a
foundational perspective.
4.2 NBG andMK
Themost common set theorywhich introduces an ontology both for classes and
sets is vonNeumann, Bernays andGödel’s set theory (NBG).Webriefly recall the
axioms
(i) axioms in common with ZFC : pair, union, infinity, powerset;
(ii) axioms both for sets and classes: extensionality, foundation;
(iii) axiom of limitation of size: a class is a set if and only if it is not in bijection
with the class of all setsV .
(iv) axiom schema of comprehension: for every property ϕ(x), without quanti-
fiers over classes, there exists the class {x |ϕ(x)}.
The system NBG is a conservative extension of ZFC: every sentence, relative
to sets, which is provable in NBG, is already provable in ZFC. Therefore having
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NBG as a foundation does not imply any particular ontological commitment.
The differences with ZFC are mainly at a stylistic level.19 As we mentioned in
the first paragraph the use of NBG as a possible foundation for category theory
trace back to the original paper of Eilenberg and Mac Lane.20 The advantage of
NBGwith respect to ZFC consists essentially in the explicit treatment of classes:
several constructions become easier, and, moreover, it is legitimate to quantify
over classes. As suggested in Shulman (2008), another interesting feature ofNBG
consists in the possibility of adopting a formof global choice. This, surprisingly,
is an easy consequence of the axioms. Consider the following observation due
to von Neumann:
Theorem 6. In NBG, the class of all sets, V, is well-orderable.
Proof. The classΩof all ordinals is a proper class and it iswell-ordered. By the
axiom of limitation of size this class is in bijectionwithV . This bijection induces
a well order onV . 
The fact that V is well-orderable is one of the possible formulations of the
axiom of choice for classes; in category theory the possibility to have this large
choice is sometimes essential. In fact we are generally assuming it when choos-
ing representativesofuniversal constructionsover large categories. Despite these
good points, and the several advantages over the approach internal to ZFC,NBG
still presents some problems as a possible foundational framework for category
theory: one, for example, is the use of comprehension restricted to formulas not
involving classes.21 A possible solution is then to strengthen the axioms of NBG
by allowing for arbitrary quantification in the formulas involved. The resulting
theory is known asMorse-Kelley set theory (MK). In this case, however, we have
lost conservativity over ZFC, and the theorywe endupwith is genuinely stronger
than ZFC.
In all the cases examined so far, a central problem has still to be overcome:
none of these systems allow for the construction of the category of functors be-
tween two arbitrary categories. We can form the category of functors from a
small category to an arbitrary one,22 but this construction still remains illegiti-
19Historically the interest in this system have beenmotivated by the search for an equivalent sys-
tem to ZFC which was finitely axiomatizable.
20S. Eilenberg (1945).
21When proving a statement ϕ(n) by induction in ZFC or NBG we usually form the set {n ∈
N |¬ϕ(n)} and then use the fact that N is well-ordered. Since this argument involves an istance of
comprehension, it can be carried on into these systems just in case ϕ does not involve quantifiers
over classes.
22This is allowed in all the cases examined so far: for example in ZFC a functor F : C → D, where
C is a small category, is itself a set by replacement, and therefore the collection of all these functors
form a class.
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mate when the domain of these functors is a large category. However, to a great
extent all these systems are expressive enough to copewith the cases of interest:
even if the functor category seems a perfectly reasonable construction which
can be performed regardless of size issues, most of category theory can be de-
veloped confining our attention to those functors whose domain is a small cat-
egory. This limitation is consistent with the one on completeness.23
In summary, the foundational frameworks considered so far fulfil (with dif-
ferent degrees of approximation) the requirements (A) and (B) (p. 4), but none of
themmanages to satisfy (C ) in its full generality. To sum up relative consistency
of these systems (D) we can say thatVα models ZFC if and only if (Vα, De f (Vα))24
models NBG. If α is an inaccessible than (Vα, Vα+1)models both NBG andMK.
5 Large categories and Universes
small = “∈ U ” /lar g e = “∈ U ”
It is difficult to trace back to the first appearance of the concept of a universe.
Essentially, it captures the idea of a collection closed under certain operations.
But why introduce universes in the context of set-theoretic foundations of cat-
egory theory? As Shulman (2008) suggests, we can reason as follows: on an in-
formal level what we need for freely manipulating large categories seems to be
a theory of classes which resembles closely ZFC; in practice it should be enough
to have two copies of the axioms of ZFC, once for sets, once for classes. On a for-
mal level, universes are introduced as a more elegant (and economic) solution
to the same problem: instead of rewriting twice the axioms of ZFC we identify
specific sets in our system as good candidates to interpret large collections.
5.1 Grothendieck’s universes
As the name of this subsection suggests, the use of universes as foundational
recipe for category theory goesback toGrothendieck. Thepurposeofhisproject,
closely related to Bourbaki, was to justify the use of category theory in mathe-
matical practice (and in Grothendick’s perspective specifically in Algebraic Ge-
ometry).
Here is the definition of universe:25
23See here definition 2.
24De f (X ) denotes the set of all the subsets definable from element of X , i.e. sets of the form {x ∈
X |ϕ(x)}, where φ(x) can contain parameters from X and all its quantifiers range only over elements
of X .
25In the original presentation (Bourbaki (1972), p. 185) the definition of universe also includes
closure under ordered pairs which are a primitive notion in Bourbaki’s presentation.
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Definition 5. A set U is aGrothendieck universe if the following conditions hold:
(i) if y ∈ x ∈ U, theny ∈ U ;
(ii) if x, y ∈ U, then{x, y } ∈ U ;
(iii) if x ∈ U, then℘(x) ∈ U ;
(iv) if (xi )i ∈I is a family of elements ofU , and I ∈ U , then⋃i ∈I xi ∈ U .
In words, the definition says thatU is a Grothendick universe if it is a transi-
tive set closedunder pairs,26 power set andunionof elements ofU indexedby an
element ofU . In a more set-theoretical flavour, we can describe this definition
as requiringU = Vκ for some inaccessible cardinal κ (under the added hypoth-
esis thatU is uncountable27). Since inaccessible cardinals cannot be proved to
exist in ZFC,28 asserting the existence of a Grothendieck universe is a genuine
strengthening of ZFC’s axioms.
For a fixed Grothendieck universe U , we can rephrase our dichotomy be-
tween small and large by calling a category large whenever its collection of ob-
jects is a set not belonging toU . In case the universe is uncountable this is equiv-
alent to assert that a category is small if and only if its collection of objects has
rank less than κ, where κ is inaccessible.
This third approach, does not just give a satisfactory solution to conditions
(A) and (B) (page 4), but it also allows for the constructionof the categoryof func-
torsbetweenarbitrary categories (requirementC). Inaddition, it gives amoreex-
pressive semantics for the term large: we do not collapse every large collection
to the size ofV , as it happens inNBG,butwe can retain amore careful distinction
between small, large and even larger categories.
The following example gives an idea of the expressive power that we reach
when introducing universes in the metatheory.
Example 7. Every large categoryC has a category of presheaves SetCop , and, ifC is
locally small29 we can consider the Yoneda embedding y : C ↪→ SetCop .
Nevertheless we might want to be able to encode more abstract nonsense,
and not satisfied by a single universe, we would like to have at our disposal a
bigger universeU ′ (i.e. another inaccessible cardinal λ > κ), and then one other
26We do not assume as primitive the notion of ordered pair but, as usual, we define them à la
Kuratowski: (x, y ) = {{x}, {x, y }}.
27If we do not make any condition on the cardinality of U , also the emptyset, ∅, and ω are
Grothendieck universes.
28A simple argument is the following: sinceVκ , for κ inaccessible, represents a model of ZFC, if it
was possible to prove the existence of such a cardinal in ZFC, then ZFC would also prove its own
consistency, contradicting Gödel’s second incompletness theorem.
29See table on page 14 for the definition of a locally small category in presence of a universe.
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above.30 For this reason Grothendieck’s initial proposal consisted of adding not
just a single universe but an abundance. Formally we can express this by adding
to the usual axioms of ZFC the following:
Grothendick’s axiom. Every set is contained in some universe.
This axiom guarantees the existence of sufficient large sets where every pos-
sible category we can meet is included.31 Clearly, we have moved far from the
strength of ZFC: the system obtained by adding Grothendieck’s axiom to ZFC
has the same consistency as ZFC + “there exist inaccessible cardinals of arbi-
trary size”. As noticed by Mac Lane32 this axiom does not solve definitely all the
problems. We do not have any a priori certainty that changing universe does not
affect the construction of our categories, or preserves all the properties of a spe-
cific object. Consider the following example
Example 8. Let us assume that we have proved, for some property φ, the existence
of a groupG such that φ(G, H ) is true for every small groupH (for example φ could
tell us thatG is the limit of some diagram in Grp). The same argument still holds
if we interpret the notion of largeness with some specific inaccessible κ, but there
is no guarantee that the groupG will be the same under all the possible interpre-
tations.
As kindly pointed out by one of the anonymous referees, in order to obtain
this stronger propertywe should ask for the universeU to be an elementary sub-
structure ofV . For this, stronger axioms of infinity are needed, namely we have
to ask for the cardinality of theuniverse to be at least aMahlonumber. The intro-
duction of such large cardinals canbe related to a general reflectionprinciple for
ZFC.33 Even if the existence of these cardinals are given by axioms stronger than
the one asserting the existence of a single inaccessible, and also stronger than
Grothendieck’s axiom, these axioms are still quite “weak” if compared to cur-
rent large cardinal axioms used by set theorists. A similar approach based on a
general reflection principle has been sketched by Engeler and Röhrl (1969). The
following quotation concludes the paragraph where the two authors describe
their proposal:34
[. . . ] However, the main objection to this approach is quite indepen-
30One possible reason is that we do not want just to consider the category of all small categories
but also the category of all large ones, or of all locally small ones. . .
31As Shulman (2008) notes, this axiom asserts the possibility to enlarge the universe, more than
asserting the existence of multiple stratified universes.
32See Lane 1969, p. 2.
33The interested reader should consult Lévy (1960). We will come back on a much weaker formu-
lation of the reflection principle in section 5.3.
34See E. Engler (1969), p. 62.
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dent of the strength and questionability of the additional assump-
tions creating universes. We believe that it is a faulty to make a pro-
crustes bed of set theory and try, bend or break, to fit all mathemat-
ical structures into it. This does injustice, in particular to category
theory, as it denies the autonomous role that such theories play in
mathematics.
To conclude our survey of the use of universes as foundation for category
theory, we can sum up the situation with the following table:35
small Morph(C) ∈ U
locally ∀c, d ∈ Obj (C) ∈ U
small HomC(c, d) ∈ U
large Morph(C) ⊆ U ,
Morph(C) < U
enormous Morph(C) * U
5.2 Mac Lane’s proposal
[. . . ] It turns out that a flexible and effective formulation
of the present notions of category theory can be given
with a more modest addition to the standard axiomatic
set theory: the assumption that there is one universe.
Saunders Lane (1969), p. 193.
As we have already mentioned in the last paragraph, one of the first math-
ematician who highlighted some problems of the foundational approach pro-
posed by the French school of Grothendieck was SaundersMac Lane, one of the
founders of category theory.
In 1969 Mac Lane published a paper with a meaningful title: One universe
for the foundations of category theory. In this work he argues that the existence
of a single universe in ZFC is sufficient to have a foundational framework for
35Observe that we can always identify objects of C with identity morphisms. In this table we in-
dicate with Morph(C) the collection of morphisms of a category C, and with HomC(c,d) the set of
morphisms between two given objects c , d of C.
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category theory. His proposal essentially consists in weakening Grothendieck’s
axiom asking, not for an abundance of universes, but just one.
Mac Lane defines a universe as follows:
Definition 6. A set U is called a universe if:
(1) x ∈ y ∈ Uimpliesx ∈ U ;
(2) ω ∈ U ;
(3) x ∈ Uimplies℘(x) ∈ U ;
(4) x ∈ Uimplies ⋃ x ∈ U ;
(5) if f : x → y is a surjective function such that x ∈ U and y ⊂ U , then y ∈ U .
As Mac Lane notices, the conjunction of condition (4) and (5) is equivalent
to condition (iv) in definition 5. Apart from this and the requirement that U is
uncountable (condition (2) and (3)), the definition is the same as that given by
Bourbaki.36
In this framework the systematization of the dichotomy small/large is essen-
tially the same as that of Grothendieck’s school (See table on page 14). The re-
striction to a single universe allows for a (almost37) complete treatment of cate-
gory theory and, at the same time, allows us to escape from the “jungle” of mul-
tiple universes.38
Finally we remark that consistency of Mac Lane’s proposal amounts to the
consistency of ZFC + “there exists a strong inaccessible cardinal”.
5.3 Feferman’s proposal
Foundations of category theory have represented a problem of major interest
for Solomon Feferman, who came back to this topic several times during the
last forty years. He dedicated four papers39 to this issue, proposing more than a
single solution. Here we confine ourselves to the analysis of his first proposal.
ThefirstpaperwhereFefermanaddresses thequestionwaspublished in1969.40
In this work he proposes an alternative to the solution of adopting new axioms
for universes. Feferman’s idea consists in using a well-known principle of set
theory, namely the reflection principle.
36We also recall the treatment of ordered pairs as a primitive entity, characteristic of Bourbaki’s
approach.
37This approach does not allow for the construction of the category of all large categories.
38As remarked by one of the anonymous referee, the request of a single universeU insideV could
be seen as a kind of opprobrium from the point of view of a set theoretician. An alternative solution
to the universe juggling has beenmentioned at the end of the last section: see for example E. Engler
(1969).
39Namely Feferman (1969), Feferman (1977), Feferman (2006), Feferman (2004).
40See Feferman (1969).
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Feferman’s system, which we indicate as ZFC/s,41 consists, in the first in-
stance, in adding a new constant symbol s to the usual language of ZFC. Sec-
ondly we add to the axioms of ZFC further axioms in order to describe (the in-
terpretation of) s as a natural model of ZFC.42
Before giving the axioms we recall that if ϕ is a formula of the language of
ZFC, its relativization to s , denoted by ϕs , is given when all the quantifiers that
occur in ϕ are bounded by s .43
Definition 7. The system ZFC/s is given in the language L of ZFC extended with
the constant symbol s by the following axioms:
(1) Axioms of ZFC: extensionality, emptyset, pairs, union, powerset, infinity,
foundation, replacement, choice.
(2) s is not empty:
∃x(x ∈ s )
(3) s is transitive:
∀x, y (y ∈ x ∧ x ∈ s → y ∈ s )
(4) s is closed under subsets:
∀x, y (x ∈ s ∧ ∀z (z ∈ y → z ∈ x)→ y ∈ s )
(5) reflection axioms: for every formula ϕwith free variable x1,. . . , xn :
∀x1 . . .∀xn(ϕ(x1, . . . , xn)↔ ϕs (x1, . . . , xn))
The axiom schema (5) can be read in model-theoretic terms as follows: let
(M, , S) be amodel of ZFC/s,44 callMs the set {x ∈ M |xS}, and s the restriction
of  to Ms ,45 , then (M, ) is an elementary extension of (Ms, s ). In other words
the twomodels satisfy the same formula in the language L.
As we mentioned, this axiom schema, is based on the reflection principle. A
specific istance of this principle can be suitably reformulated as a theorem of
ZFC. It might be helpful to highlight the common point this reflection theorem
shares with the downward Löwenheim-Skolem theorem. The proof of the lat-
ter shows, given a model N of a theory T and an infinite subset S ⊂ N , how to
41the symbol s stands for smallness.
42A natural model of ZFC, (M, ), is a transitive model of ZFC, closed under subsets: x ⊂ y ∈ M
implies x ∈ M .
43For example, the relativization to s of the formula ∀a∃b∀x(x ∈ b ↔ ψ(x, a)) is
∀a ∈ s∃b ∈ s∀x ∈ s (x ∈ b ↔ ψs (x, a)).
44We indicate with S the element ofM which interprets the constant symbol s .
45i.e. xs y iff x, y ∈ Ms and xy .
RivistaItalianadiFilosofiaAnaliticaJunior
9:2
(2018)
133
Lorenzo Malatesta Some proposals for the set-theoretic foundations
build a modelM , such thatM ≺ N (M is an elementary substructure of N ) and
|N | = |S |. In order to obtain the modelM we build a sequence of setsMn in this
way: starting from M0 = S every Mn+1 is obtained from Mn by adding a witness
b ∈ N for every existential sentence ∃yφ(y, x1, . . . , xn) and every n-tuple of ele-
ments a1, . . . , an ∈ Mn such that ∃y ∈ N φN (y, a1, . . . , an) is a true sentence. M is
then obtained as
M =
⋃
Mn .
n∈ω
Since there are just a countable amount of sentences φ, the cardinality of the
variousMn never increases. Finally, the countable union of countable sets is still
countable from which it follows that |M | = |S |. This construction can be rear-
ranged to be carried out on the cumulative hierarchy ofVα’s. Even if thismethod
enables us “to buildmodels of ZFC”, this does not violate Gödel’s second incom-
pletness theorem. Indeed even if we can reflect every finite conjunction of sen-
tences of ZFC, we are not able to reflect at once a single infinite conjunction of
sentences expressing thatVκ is a natural model of ZFC for a specific κ.
Oneof themain advantages of this “logical” approach consists exactly in this:
the “formal description” of s as a “naturalmodel of ZFC” is not sufficient to prove
in ZFC that (the interpretation of) s is a natural model of ZFC. This, in fact, al-
lows Feferman to prove the following important result in Feferman (1977):
Theorem 9. ZFC/s is a conservative extension of ZFC.
This result guarantees that we have not really strengthen our starting set the-
ory; in particular, in categorical terms this means that all that can be proved in
ZFC/s about small objects, even using large categories, can already be proved in
ZFC. Now it should be sufficiently clear that interpreting small as “element of
S” and large as “set not necessarily in S”, what we have is an appropriate foun-
dational framework where it is possible to interpret definitions and theorems of
category theory.
As in the other cases we can evaluate the expressive power of Feferman’s sys-
tem using the conditions on page 4. While we can check that ZFC/s easily meet
(A), (B), (D), the problem with functor categories noticed with other systems is
also complicated in this case: we do not only have a limitation of size for the
domain of the functors, but we also have to confine ourselves to consider those
functor categories whose objects are S-definable. This is a consequence of the
relativization of the replacement axioms to s , which can be considered to ex-
press the inaccessibility of s under all functions definable inL.46 In otherwords,
46See Feferman (1969), p. 208.
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if we read the replacement axioms as saying that the image of a set under a class-
function is still a set, their relativization can be rephrased as stating that the im-
age of a set under a function-class which is definable from elements of S is still
a set. This restriction, even if apparently innocuous, can have annoying conse-
quences: for example we should change the notion of completeness (definition
2) in ZFC/s, requiring limits for “all small functors” (i.e functors definable from
S) rather then for all functors with small domain.
5.4 Some comments on Feferman’s proposal
Feferman has been one of the first mathematical-logicians to get interested in
foundations of category theory: his motivation has been primarily to fill the gap
between the rapid development of category theory and its proper systematiza-
tion inside the mathematical edifice.
Initially a careful attitude ledhim to investigate the foundationsof this theory
withdifferent systemsof set theory. Only later he turnedhis attention to a critical
analysis of a categorical foundation of all mathematics.47
The system proposed by Feferman in Feferman 1969 and the conservativity
result over ZFC are of particular interest for a foundational analysis of category
theory. The relevance of Feferman’s contribution is well expressed in the words
of Blass48
This approach developed in Feferman (1969), has two advantages.
First, the assumptions guarantee that, if we prove a theorem about
small sets by using large categories, then the same theorem holds for
arbitrary sets; [. . . ]. Second, the assumptions do not really go beyond
ZFC; any assertion in the first-order language, not mentioning κ,49
that can be proved using these assumption can also be proved with-
out them.
The second feature of Feferman’s system mentioned by Blass is the conser-
vativity result of the previous paragraph (theorem 9). This theorem highlights
the “conventional” use of inaccessible cardinals when discussing set-theoretic
foundation of category theory. As Shulman notes:
[. . . ] Thus we obtain a precise version of our intuition that the use
of inaccessibles in category theory is merely for convenience: since
many categorical proofs statedusing inaccessibles canbe formalized
47The main argument of his criticism for a possible categorical foundation of all math was firstly
formulated in his ’77 paper Feferman (1977). He then came back to the same argument in his suc-
cessive works.
48Blass (1984), page 8.
49Blass uses κ to indicate the level of the cumulative hierarchy which corresponds to the interpre-
tation of the added constant symbol s in Feferman’s system.
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in ZFC/s, any consequence of such a theorem not referring explicitly
to inaccessibles is also provable purely in ZFC.
Even if inaccessible cardinals, and in general stronger axiomsof infinity, have
became part of modern mathematical research, their use in foundational con-
texts remains dubious. Again, in the words of the philosopher Marquis:50
Any reference to inaccessibles is simply removed. This is an exact
formulation of the conviction that questions of size are only used to
justify certain general construction and they do not bear on the real
mathematical contentof the constructionsand its consequences. [. . . ]
Feferman’s results51 are important for theycanbe interpretedas show-
ing that as far as set theory is concerned, category theory does not
raise new foundational problem.
50Marquis (2009), pp. 183-184.
51The reference is to Feferman (1969).
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